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Strategies of Alignment: 
Organizational Identity Management and Strategic Change at Bang & Olufsen 
 
 
During periods of strategic change, maintaining the congruence between new 
configurations of resources and activities (strategic investments) and how these new 
configurations are communicated to external organizational constituents (strategic 
projections) is an important task facing organizational leaders. One part of this activity is to 
manage organizational identity to ensure that the various strategic projections produced by 
organizational members are coherent and support the new strategic investments. Little is 
known, however, about how organizational leaders accomplish this crucial task. This study of 
strategic change at Bang & Olufsen highlights the different strategies available to 
organizational leaders to ensure members’ identity beliefs are aligned with their own beliefs 
about the distinctive and appealing organizational features that result from the new strategic 
investments and result in appropriate strategic projections. Our findings highlight the internal 
identity work – or identity management – that organizational leaders engage in to preserve 
this congruence. The findings also complement the current emphasis in the literature on the 
social validation of organizational identities by pointing to the importance of a connection 
between identity claims and beliefs, strategic projections, and the material reality of 
organizational products, practices and structures. 
 
Key words: Identity management, strategic change, organizational identity, organizational 
image, projected images, identity drift, identity maintenance
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The capacity of an organization to attract resources depends in part on the consistency 
among its resources and activities (its strategic investments), the images it projects (its 
strategic projections), and its external constituents’ interests and expectations (Rindova and 
Fombrun, 1999). Strategic investments directly shape the material conditions of exchange 
between an organization and its constituents; strategic projections influence how favourably 
these constituents regard the organization and how willing they are to support it (Scott and 
Lane, 2000). When environmental conditions change, organizations may need to adapt both 
their configuration of resources and activities and the image they project in order to preserve 
or regain consistency with external constituents’ expectations. 
Organizational leaders’ efforts to change the organization, however, may collide with 
members’ claims and beliefs about central, enduring and distinctive attributes of the 
organization – or, in other words, with its organizational identity (Albert and Whetten, 1985; 
Ashforth, Harrison and Corley, 2008). Organizational identity is believed to play a central 
role in ensuring coherence in strategic efforts (Ashforth and Mael, 1996) and communication 
(Fombrun, 1996). Members’ beliefs about the identity of the organization influence the 
strategic issues they attend to (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991), how they interpret these issues 
(Gioia and Thomas, 1996), the relative value they attribute to different resources and 
capabilities (Glynn, 2000), and the images they endeavour to project outside (Fombrun, 
1996). 
Organizational identity, however, is also inherently inertial (Albert and Whetten, 
1985; Ashforth and Mael, 1996). Organizational members tend to resist changes that clash 
with established beliefs (Reger, Gustafson, Demarie and Mullane, 1994; Nag, Corley and 
Gioia, 2007). If not properly managed, organizational identity may therefore hamper strategic 
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change. Realigning internal and external constituents1 around a new conceptualization of the 
organization reflecting a new strategic direction, then, is often central to the effective 
management of strategic change (Gioia, Thomas, Clark and Chittipeddi, 1994). 
However, despite its relevance for the successful implementation of strategic change, 
theoretical understandings of this aspect of the identity-strategy connection are not well 
developed. While scholars generally agree that organizational leaders play a central role in 
shaping organizational identity (Ashforth and Mael, 1996; Scott and Lane, 2000) and 
preserving alignment among internal and external perceptions of an organization (Hatch and 
Schultz 1997), less is known about how they do it. In fact, we know relatively little about 
why and how organizational leaders engage in identity management in order to preserve 
alignment among organizational identity, strategic investments, and projections, and the 
strategies and tactics available to them as they do so. 
In this paper, we present the findings of a longitudinal case study of strategic change 
at Bang & Olufsen (B&O), a Danish producer of consumer electronics, that begin to unpack 
the processes through which managers attempt to preserve the congruence among 
organizational features resulting from past and current strategic investments, strategic 
projections, and the expectations of constituents2. In doing so, our observations contribute to 
the growing literature on the interplay between identity and strategy (e.g. Ashforth and Mael, 
1996; Goia and Thomas, 1996; Corley and Gioia, 2004; Kjergaard, Morsing and Ravasi, 
2011) by adding to our understanding of how organizational leaders use identity-related 
initiatives to support strategy formulation and implementation. 
                                                 
1
 The distinction between what is ‘internal’ and what is ‘external’ can be controversial. We follow the position 
exemplified by Brown, Dacin, Pratt and Whetten (2006) and distinguish between internal and external 
constituents based on their inclusion within the formal boundaries of the organization.  
2
 Our research builds on a data set used in a previous study (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006) to investigate a different 
aspect of the management of identity. Given the paucity of rich empirical settings where organizational identity 
processes can be observed, developing multiple lines of inquiry from a single study is not infrequent in 
organizational identity research (see for instance Gioia, Thomas, Clark and Chittipeddi, 1994 and Gioia and 
Thomas, 1996; Humphreys and Brown, 2002 and Brown and Humphreys, 2006; Corley, 2004 and Corley and 
Gioia, 2004). 
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Theoretical Background 
Organizational Identity, Strategy and Image 
The concept of organizational identity was initially understood as those attributes of 
an organization that members perceive as central, enduring, and distinctive (Albert and 
Whetten, 1985). Later conceptual developments led scholars to use the same term to refer to 
either members’ beliefs about what an organization is and stands for (e.g. Corley and Gioia, 
2004), or official labels used in self-referential discourse (e.g. Whetten and Mackey, 2002). 
For the sake of terminological clarity, in this paper we follow recent work proposing the use 
of the term identity beliefs for the former and identity claims for the latter (Ravasi and 
Schultz, 2006).  
Research suggests that identity beliefs influence both strategic investments and 
strategic projections. Identity beliefs provide a reference for assessing the importance of 
events and the extent to which they are worthy of attention (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). 
They also provide a cognitive framework for members’ interpretations of these events (Gioia 
and Thomas, 1996; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal and Hunt, 1998), and shape perceptions of what 
resources and capabilities are perceived as “strategic” and deserving of the allocation of 
scarce resources (Glynn, 2000). Eventually, then, identity beliefs influence what Rindova and 
Fombrun (1999) refer to as strategic investments – that is, the deliberate allocation of 
resources to address the needs and expectations of constituents by enhancing organizational 
capabilities, defining product features, etc.  
Members’ beliefs about an organization’s identity also influence the images of the 
organization they try to project, as they engage, for instance, in advertising and investor 
relations (Price et al., 2008), deal with environmental issues, face emergencies (Dutton and 
Dukerich, 1991), or support social activities (Sjovall and Talk, 2004). Rindova and Fombrun 
(1999) refer to these images as strategic projections, to highlight their importance in 
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providing constituents with information about the characteristics of the organization, and with 
“ready-made interpretations” of these characteristics. In doing so, strategic projections are 
central to the formation of external constituents’ perceptions of the organization – that is of 
the organization’s image (Gioia et al., 2000; Price and Gioia, 2008).  
From a managerial perspective, all the images projected by an organization should be 
coherent with strategic investments, and they should be part of concerted, explicit efforts to 
clearly communicate the organization’s identity and to create favourable perceptions among 
external constituents (Fombrun, 1996; Rindova, Petkova and Kotha, 2007). As Rindova and 
Fombrun observe, lack of consistency among projections – and between them and the 
investments they are intended to emphasize – is likely to be detrimental to the organization:  
The more consistent strategic projections are with one another and with a 
firm’s strategic investments, the more useful they are to constituents in making 
interpretations and the more they contribute to the construction of competitive 
advantage … Strategic projections not supported by investments can lead to a 
loss of credibility; investments not supported by strategic projections may fall 
short of realizing their value-creating potential (Rindova and Fombrun, 1999: 
697-698) 
However, while strategic investments generally reflect organizational leaders’ beliefs 
and aspirations, strategic projections are also affected directly and indirectly by members’ 
activities, as they design products and stores, plan advertising campaigns, and more generally 
interact with investors, customers, the media, etc. The co-existence of multiple identities in 
an organization (Pratt and Foreman, 2000), then, may result in partly inconsistent projections.  
Organizational Identity and Strategic Change 
Under normal circumstances, identity claims and beliefs represent a source of 
coherence and stability for an organization (Albert and Whetten, 1985). Members tend to 
oppose initiatives that are inconsistent with identity beliefs, as they will find them difficult to 
understand and “not appropriate” for the organization (Reger et al., 1994). Indeed, scholars, 
in a critical tradition, observe how organizational leaders engage in various forms of identity 
  5 
regulation to control employees’ behaviour, by influencing their understandings of the 
organization and of themselves as organizational members (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002; 
Alvesson and Kärreman, 2008). Over time, then, identity claims and beliefs may become 
embedded in patterns of power (e.g. Humphreys and Brown, 2002), knowledge and practice 
(e.g. Nag et al., 2007) that induce individuals to resist changes that challenge established 
equilibria.  
Research shows, however, that a gap between current performance and the ambitions 
of organizational leaders may well induce leaders to engage in strategic change that is not 
congruent with the identity of the organization (e.g. Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Rindova et al., 
2011; Kjergaard et al., 2011). In these circumstances, strategic investments and, to some 
extent strategic projections, are likely to reflect a new, envisioned identity and image quite 
different from the current identity (Gioia and Thomas, 1996). Conversely, the rest of the 
organization is less likely to acknowledge the need for identity change (Corley, 2004), if not 
exhibit outright resistance to it (Humphreys and Brown, 2002; Nag et al., 2007).  
In these cases, preserving congruence among strategic investments and multiple 
projections, some of which may not be under direct control of the organizational leaders, 
require the acknowledgement – and proper management – of an “identity gap” between 
current beliefs and future aspirations (Reger et al., 1994). Unattended or improperly managed 
identities may result in multiple and partly divergent beliefs and aspirations, possibly 
undermining the change process. Ensuring alignment between members’ beliefs and new 
strategies reflecting the aspirations of managers is central to the successful implementation of 
the desired changes (Gioia et al., 1994). 
The Management of Organizational Identity 
The way organizations are perceived by internal and external constituents is shaped in 
important ways by a process of “claim-making” in which influential members and groups try 
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to persuade other internal and/or external actors to accept their conceptualizations of the 
central, enduring and distinctive features of the organization (Ashforth and Mael, 1996; 
Glynn, 2000). Among these actors, top managers enjoy a considerable advantage (Scott and 
Lane, 2000; Rodrigues and Child, 2008). They are expected to represent and to speak “on 
behalf” of the organization (Cheney, 1983), and they have privileged access to various 
channels of communication. Their claims, therefore, provide important cues that help internal 
and external constituents make sense of what the organization is and stands for (Hatch and 
Schultz, 1997; Whetten and Mackey, 2002). 
In many organizations, a set of official identity claims – explicit statements of what 
the organization is and stands for, embodied in formal documents, uttered in public speeches, 
etc. – are expected to provide legitimate and consistent narratives for making sense of the 
organization (Ashforth and Mael, 1996; Czarniawska, 1997). Official claims are an important 
way in which organizational leaders attempt to influence how internal and/or external 
constituents interpret and relate to the organization (Corley and Gioia, 2004; Gioia, Price, 
Hamilton and Thomas, 2010; Whetten and Mackey, 2002) to support strategies aimed at 
securing critical resources (Scott and Lane, 2000). Internally, official claims complement 
other forms of identity regulation, such as human resource management practices (Alvesson 
and Willmott, 2002; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2008) or the architecture of corporate buildings 
(Wassermann and Frenkel, 2011). Externally, official claims attempt to direct the attention of 
constituents to organizational attributes that are relevant to their interests and expectations 
(Rindova and Fombrun, 1999). 
Ideally, then, identity claims should reflect what organizational members – and 
organizational leaders in particular – envision as a desirable and attractive set of projected 
features – that is, their desired organizational image (Gioia and Thomas, 1996) – and 
coordinate the purposeful projection of this desired image through the various forms of 
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communication mentioned earlier.  
Managing Identity Discrepancies 
Past research has highlighted how discrepancies may arise between current and 
desired (e.g. Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Corley and Gioia, 2004) and internal and external 
perceptions of an organization (e.g. Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). Corley (2004) generally 
refers to these occurrences as identity discrepancies. We will follow this convention in this 
paper. 
The most widely studied discrepancy is what Corley (2004) refers to as a construed 
image discrepancy. Past literature has associated construed image discrepancy primarily with 
images refracted by the media or other institutional intermediaries (e.g. Elsbach and Kramer, 
1996), and it has shown how organizational members react to images that they perceive as 
unfavourable or incoherent with their own perceptions by engaging in actions aimed at 
restoring a desirable image (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Martins, 
2005). Gioia, Schultz and Corley (2000) outline different tactics available to organizational 
leaders to realign external perceptions with internal perceptions and aspirations. These tactics 
focus on the manipulation of external images through better communication or impression 
management (see also Elsbach, 2006).  
While the interplay between organizational identity and image has been a concern of 
identity scholars for a long time, less is know about identity-strategy gaps. Indeed, scholars 
acknowledge that, in some cases, organizational leaders may perceive the need for the whole 
organization to question current identity beliefs in order to support new strategic investments 
and projections (Gioia et al., 2000: 68; Elsbach, 2006: 40). However, despite the strategic 
relevance of the issue (Rindova and Fombrun, 1999), little is known about what brings 
organizational leaders to engage in identity management in order to preserve alignment 
among organizational identity, strategic investments and projections, and the strategies and 
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tactics available to them as they do so. In the remainder of this article, we present findings 
that begin to address these issues.  
Research Method 
Research Setting  
Bang & Olufsen A/S is a Danish producer of expensive, high-quality, audio-video 
systems founded in 1925. By the late 1960s, following a strategy of focusing on quality, 
innovation and design, B&O achieved considerable international success including receiving 
a number of national and international design awards for its products. In the early 1970s, due 
to the increasing dominance of Japanese electronics companies, B&O began to feel rising 
pressure from dealers to imitate Japanese technology and Japanese design. Top managers 
held their ground, however, believing that only by maintaining its position as an alternative to 
its Japanese competitors could the company preserve its distinctive image and competitive 
positioning.  
During the 1980s, new product development focused on the most expensive lines and 
the average price of products steadily increased. Furthermore, communication policies 
increasingly concentrated on luxury at the expense of technical and design quality. When a 
general economic decline abruptly reduced sales in 1990-1991, the high cost structure of the 
company generated unprecedented losses. Anders Knutsen, the former VP responsible for 
Product Development, Production and Supply, replaced the CEO, Vagn Andersen. At first, 
the newly appointed CEO gave priority to regaining efficiency and reducing the high 
production and distribution costs of the company. The headquarters and the international 
sales networks were streamlined, the organizational structure was redesigned for higher 
flexibility and quicker decision making, and two factories were closed resulting in more than 
700 lay-offs (out of a total work force of 3100). A redesign of the logistic system also 
ensured faster supply of components and delivery of products to the stores. However, 
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restructuring the company, although significantly reducing losses, did not help regain sales 
growth and profitability.  
Top managers at B&O interpreted the abrupt sales decline as a consequence of an 
increasing gap between how the company and its products were perceived and portrayed by 
various actors (customers, dealers, the press, etc.) and changing societal values. The 
Chairman of the Board, Peter Skak Olufsen, declared at the company General Assembly that 
the Gulf War had led to substantial changes in society, which had negatively affected the 
appeal of the current image of the organization and its products. These considerations brought 
the new CEO to conclude that a revision of product and communication policies was in order 
to change how external constituents perceived B&O and its products. 
This decision was embedded in a broader strategic agenda centred on the 
reaffirmation of the attributes and capabilities that, according to the managers, distinguished 
the company and its products from its larger competitors. Since its founding, B&O had 
adopted a strategy of differentiation. Initially, the strategy was based on superior quality and 
innovation. During the sixties, pushed by the work of chief product developer Jens Bang and 
designer Jacob Jensen, this strategy had incorporated an additional element: distinctive 
product design. Over the years, official claims such as advertising taglines (“B&O: for those 
who discuss design and quality before price” from 1966-1971) and corporate mottos (“We 
think different!” from 1974) had been used to summarize this differentiation. In the 1970s, 
pressed by large competitors who benefited from economies of scale in production and 
research, managers had engaged in explicit reflections on unique drivers of differentiation, 
culminating in the first articulation of their understandings about the identity of the 
organization: the Seven Corporate Identity Components.  
The set of activities that Mr. Knutsen initiated to regain consistency among how 
internal and external actors perceived and portrayed B&O was, then, only the latest 
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manifestation of a traditional concern with identity as a way to periodically rethink the 
strategy of the organization. The fact that organizational leaders deliberately engaged in 
explicit debate and multiple initiatives that addressed what they referred to as the “identity” 
and the “essence” of the organization made B&O an extreme case – an ideal setting where the 
phenomenon of interest is “transparently observable” (Pettigrew, 1990: 275), thereby 
facilitating its investigation. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Our study combined longitudinal case analysis (Yin, 1984) with grounded-theory 
building (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), and relied on a broad range of data sources (see Table 1). 
We used these sources: i) to build an understanding of the historical, organizational and 
strategic context within which the observed process unfolded; ii) to capture how 
organizational leaders interpreted and responded to identity-related issues; iii) to trace the 
strategies that they engaged in to address these issues; and, more generally, iv) to triangulate 
managers’ observations and interpretations with other sources of data.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Once the data was collected, we performed multiple iterations between our data and 
our emerging interpretive framework (Locke 2001). For the sake of clarity, we present our 
analysis in three broad sequential steps. 
Phase 1. Familiarization with the context and longitudinal reconstruction of events. 
Following prescriptions for case-based research (Yin 1994), in the first phase we drew on 
multiple sources (corporate biographies, archival sources, in-house magazines, and 
interviews) to build a detailed narrative of the history of the organization (61 pages) from its 
founding in 1927 to 1998. This preliminary analysis helped us produce an accurate timeline 
of events and actions, and, at a later stage, helped us relate our emerging interpretations to the 
  11 
historical, organizational, and strategic context of our setting. Our narrative described in 
particular details the events and actions that occurred between 1990 and 1998, in order to 
accurately trace identity-related initiatives and to embed them in broader organizational and 
strategic changes.  
Phase 2. Development of a grounded model, based on insiders’ interpretations. In the 
second phase, following a well-established approach in organizational identity research (e.g. 
Corley and Gioia, 2004; Nag et al., 2007), we used grounded theory building to produce an 
interpretive framework of identity-related dynamics from the perspective of our informants. 
Our analysis started with open coding of our textual database (interviews, house magazines, 
biographies and other internal archival documents) to uncover common themes and an initial 
set of categories to break up the data for further comparative analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Locke, 2001). The frequent and explicit use of terms such as “identity”, “essence” or 
“image” facilitated the selection of relevant text segments. These passages were provisionally 
coded with in-vivo terms and phrases used by our informants (Locke, 2001: 65). 
In a further round of coding, we gradually collapsed codes that, although varying in 
specific terms, were similar in essence, into first-order categories. We associated these 
categories to analytical codes – working labels induced by the researchers, but that could still 
be considered meaningful to the informants (see Nag et al., 2007). The two researchers 
independently conducted this second stage and a later comparison showed a substantial 
accord; discrepancies were solved through mutual agreement. This step allowed us to move 
from provisional to more substantive categories (Locke, 2001: 73).  
As we grouped in-vivo codes into first-order categories, we started discerning 
conceptual links among the emerging categories; accordingly, we tentatively combined first-
order categories into fewer, broader and more theoretically relevant second-order categories 
that addressed more directly the overarching question leading our investigation. As data 
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collection and analysis proceeded within and across cases, we “tested” these categories more 
systematically against our database. During these successive rounds, we carefully scrutinized 
our database for data that would – or would not – fit with each emerging category or suggest 
a redefinition of it. 
Phase 3. Triangulation and substantiation of the emerging interpretive framework. As 
core categories emerged from our analysis, we turned to axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998: 123) to uncover relationships among these categories. We built chronological tables 
linking strategic decisions, identity-related initiatives and performance outcomes in order to 
establish the sequence of events. Further iteration between our emerging theoretical 
framework and our database, helped us triangulate our informants’ observations with factual 
and historical data that could substantiate and corroborate them. At this stage, we tried to 
verify the consequentiality of managers’ reflections and statements about the identity of the 
organization for organizational policies, structures, and practices. In other words, by 
searching for triangulating evidence, we attempted to verify whether new statements were 
merely corporate rhetoric, or whether they could plausibly be considered a genuine reflection 
of managers’ beliefs and aspirations, manifested also in substantial action3.      
The analysis carried out at this stage enriched our emerging model with three 
additional categories – reformulation of identity claims, identity-consistent strategic 
investments, and identity-consistent strategic projections. At this stage, second-order 
categories were grouped into three broader overarching themes associated with perceived 
sources of misalignment, identity management strategies, and identity-related outcome. 
Figure 1 depicts the complete data structure that emerged through this process, presenting the 
                                                 
3
 Of course, we have no way to know for certain whether these decisions were genuinely driven by managers’ 
identity beliefs and aspirations, or whether they also or primarily reflected other considerations. However, the 
fact that they were explained (to us during interviews, and to the employees in internal communication) in terms 
of the identity of the organization reflects a fundamental function of identity claims, which is providing a 
consistent narrative for internal and external audiences to make and give sense of the organization and its 
actions (Whetten and Mackey, 2002). 
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first-order codes and their relation to the second-order categories, and overarching themes we 
generated. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Following Locke (2001: 76), we tested alternative conceptual frames until we 
assembled our categories into an overarching process model fitting our evidence. In order to 
increase reliability, our analysis and interpretations were repeatedly submitted to two of our 
informants for feedback (see Corbin and Strauss, 1990: 11). We also compared our 
interpretations with those of other external observers such as business journalists (e.g. 
Poulsen, 1997) and other academic researchers (e.g. Kets de Vries, 1999; Hatch and Schultz, 
2001). The interpretative framework that emerged will be presented in the next section. 
Findings 
At Bang & Olufsen, the engagement of organizational leaders in identity management 
was motivated by their perception of an inconsistency among the ways that B&O had been 
perceived and portrayed inside and outside the organization. Managers attributed current 
identity-related problems to strategic changes occurring in the course of the 1980s, which, in 
their view, had led to the gradual loss of clarity and consensus inside the organization about 
what was considered central and distinctive about B&O (identity drift), resulting in multiple 
and partially inconsistent strategic projections (image blurring). 
From the point of view of the new top management team, recovering acceptable 
performance levels required not only new strategic investments, but also adjustments in the 
way members understood their organization and communicated about it directly and 
indirectly. They viewed a re-alignment of internal beliefs (and strategic projections) as 
essential to regain a coherent organizational image that would once again attract the support 
of critical constituents. In order to do so, managers engaged in a set of identity-related 
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initiatives that reflected three broader identity management strategies (identity reassessment, 
identity refocus, and identity tuning) – each strategy resting on various related initiatives – in 
order to inspire a new narrative about the central and distinctive attributes of the organization 
(the revision of identity claims), and to promote the consistent projection of images (identity-
consistent strategic projections) that were coherent with the perceived expectations of 
constituents on one side, and grounded in focused adjustments in organizational products, 
practices, etc. (identity-consistent strategic investments) on the other.  
In the remainder of the section, following common prescriptions for qualitative 
research (Eisenhart and Grabner, 2007), we intertwine a detailed narrative of our observations 
with theoretical reflections to articulate our emerging model (Figure 2).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
  
Following recent recommendations for data reporting in qualitative research (Pratt, 
2009), we provide additional selected quotations supporting our interpretations in Table 2. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
                                               --------------------------------- 
Identity drift  
According to informants, between 1972 and the early 1980s the images projected by 
the organization had followed clearly defined identity claims embodied in the Seven 
Corporate Identity Components (the Seven CICs): seven features – Authenticity, 
Autovisuality, Credibility, Domesticity, Essentiality, Individuality and Inventiveness – that 
“identified and described the company’s goals and personality, its identity” (Bang and 
Palshøy, 2000: 86). An internal publication described in detail each component and 
exemplified it with reference to product design and corporate communication (see Table 1).  
The Seven CICs had emerged from deep reflections on attitudes and practices that 
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differentiated B&O from its competitors carried out in 1972. The notions of Essentiality and 
Autovisuality, for example, referred to the simple, self-explanatory design of user interfaces. 
Credibility, on the other hand, was associated with careful planning of changes in product 
portfolio, and in “no discount-no obsolescence” retail policies. Inventiveness, instead, was 
related to a perceived capacity to pioneer technological innovation using the results of basic 
research creatively, as manifested in the release of the first fully transistorized radio in 1964 
and the first record player with a tangential arm in 1972.  
Top managers intended the Seven CICs to promote the coordinated projection of a 
distinctive image4. According to informants, throughout the 1970s product development and 
advertising faithfully followed the guidelines embodied in the Seven CICs. As two senior 
managers who had been deeply involved in those events later observed: 
The Seven CICs became a textbook model for building a corporate identity 
with the full acceptance of the staff (Bang and Palshøy, 2000: 88). 
Over time, however, the influence of the Seven CICs on the organization seemed to 
wane. At the time of our study, the “little red book” illustrating the Seven CICs was still 
circulating and posters were still hanging on the walls. However, informants observed how 
they did not inform communication activities as they used to in the past. As a member 
observed:  
When I joined the company nine years ago, the company’s ideas were 
drummed into our heads. We heard about the Seven Corporate Identity 
Components – and we were tested on it. Since then, it has gone out of fashion. 
(Communication Manager) 
Various sources attributed part of the responsibility of this change to the top 
management team running the organization during the 1980s, following the departure of Jens 
Bang. According to informants, under the leadership of CEO Vagn Andersen, recruited in the 
1980 from outside, management had placed increasing emphasis on “exclusivity” and 
                                                 
4
 At B&O, product design was considered central to the image projected by the organization: “Bang and Olufsen 
has never doubted that its identity is closely connected with its products which are – and always have been – the 
company’s strongest means of communication” (1992/1993 Annual Report). 
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“luxury” (see Table 2). Informants suggested the new top management was very “image-
oriented”, and was “dazzled” by the increasing global recognition of the company manifested 
in numerous design awards and the attention of prestigious international arts and cultural 
institutions. Understanding B&O as a “luxury company” had substantial implications for 
product development, advertising, and retailing. 
Following the idea that B&O should sell only the most expensive products, the new 
top management team discontinued lower level product development. Advertising campaigns 
and commercial catalogues began to associate products with luxury symbols. An informant 
showed us examples of communication material from the mid 1970s and the late 1980s, and 
commented how the “unobtrusive style” and the “human side” of the products had been lost 
to “marble and empty banqueting halls”. As managers later recalled:  
The main catalogue was shorn of argument, poetry and sensibility, portraying 
environments with which only the rich could identify (Bang and Palshøy, 
2000: 104).  
So-called “prime site” flagship stores were established in the most exclusive and 
expensive areas of big cities, with no regard for operating costs. Seasonal launches in exotic 
places were used to secure dealers’ loyalty. According to informants, eventually the company 
came to be portrayed as “an expensive luxury brand”.  
During the 1980s, the beliefs and ambitions of the top management team were 
consistent with the rise of a young, affluent social class whose values and lifestyles were 
characterized by hedonism, ostentatiousness, and the search for social affirmation through 
engagement in conspicuous consumption – a group often referred to as “yuppies.” However, 
senior managers later lamented that the increasing emphasis on luxury that characterized the 
new strategy led members of the organization to overlook the essential ideas, embodied in the 
Seven CICs, that had traditionally driven product design and marketing (Bang and Palshøy, 
2000: 102). A corporate historian later observed how in those years, the top management 
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built “a façade towards the outer world which [created a] superficial picture of the company 
competencies” (Poulsen, 1997, p. 39).  
Theoretically, the process our informants described can be considered as an instance 
of identity drift (Albert and Whetten, 1985) – that is the increasing misalignment between 
traditional claims and new, yet unacknowledged, beliefs manifested in changing policies, 
structures, and practices. As a form of identity adaptation, identity drift differs from the 
adaptive instability process described by Gioia and colleagues (Gioia et al., 2000), in that 
whereas the latter implies the periodic renegotiation of the meanings associated with 
unchanging official claims, identity drift is associated with the gradual and tacit loss of the 
salience of official claims for strategic investments. During identity drift official identity 
claims are neither enforced nor replaced. In the absence of revised claims, changing beliefs 
and aspirations are not explicitly acknowledged, and internal and external constituents lack 
guidance about how to make sense of (and give sense to) the organization. From the 
perspective of members, a drifting identity may produce a temporal identity discrepancy (see 
Corley, 2004), understood as a perceived misalignment between past and present 
conceptualizations of the organization. Different beliefs are likely to arise as members 
interpret and respond differently to changing strategies and practices reflecting new and 
emerging understandings. Multiple beliefs, in turn, may result in multiple and partly 
incoherent projections. According to different sources (see Table 2), this was the case also at 
B&O.  
Image blurring 
According to informants, in the early 1990s, drifting managerial beliefs and 
aspirations eventually produced inconsistent strategic projections, resulting in what managers 
referred to as a “blurred” organizational image (see Table 2). Of particular concern was the 
growing detachment between the beliefs that, according to informants, inspired product 
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development on one side and marketing on the other. As an external observer remarked: 
The marketing people addressed an international audience with a message they 
thought was the same, but which was not. When the product said “new 
thinking”, marketing said “elegance”. When the product said “lifestyle”, 
marketing said “status symbol”. (Poulsen, 1997: 117) 
As a result, marketing communication increasingly neglected important product features and 
qualities, as described in the previous sub-section.  
Managers also considered the increasing autonomy of some subsidiaries in running 
local promotional activities as another source of confusion. For instance, informants 
mentioned the decision of the French subsidiary to distribute high-end products to a large 
discounter as an example of the loss of consistency between the images projected by various 
units. As managers lamented, “more and more people began to influence communication 
decisions without knowing the strategy”, eventually resulting in the incoherent strategic 
projections (see Table 2). 
A further source of discrepancy was associated with the way retailers portrayed B&O 
to prospective clients. B&O relied on a network of more than 3,200 independent dealers. 
Many of these dealers sold B&O products exclusively and also provided after sales service. 
Even non-exclusive stores dedicated at least a wall or a window to the company’s products, 
using merchandising, product exposure tools, and shop fronts designed and provided by 
B&O. Blind tests in the shops, however, revealed that, when conducting a sale, more than 
30% of the retailers around Europe emphasized only the formal and aesthetic aspects of the 
products, reinforcing the idea among potential customers that the only really distinctive 
attribute of the organization was styling.  
Current theory maintains that projecting different images to different constituents 
characterized by different interests and expectations may be instrumental to preserve their 
consensus (Price et al., 2008). At B&O, however, different and partly discrepant images 
reached the same constituent. According to informants, eventually these projections produced 
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a partial, inconsistent, and not entirely appealing representation of the organization. Indeed, 
in the absence of clarity and consistency among strategic projections, constituents will be 
uncertain about whether and how the strategic investments of the organization – manifested 
in its capabilities, product features, etc. – address their needs and expectations (Rindova and 
Fombrun, 1999). We refer to this phenomenon as image blurring – defined as the 
simultaneous projection of multiple and inconsistent images about an organization – and we 
argue that, from the perspective of managers, this situation represent a form of projected 
image discrepancy, understood as a perceived misalignment among strategic projections, 
and/or between these projections and the beliefs and aspirations of managers. Theoretically, 
image blurring can be explained in terms of multiple and inconsistent identity beliefs and/or 
image aspirations among members (Pratt and Foreman, 2000). Our informants attributed this 
phenomenon to the loss of congruence among members’ beliefs that followed the gradual and 
unacknowledged detachment of top managers’ beliefs and aspirations from traditional 
identity claims. 
Identity Reassessment 
In the previous sub-section, we have illustrated how, according to informants, in the 
1980s, B&O had suffered from a combination of temporal identity discrepancy and projected 
image discrepancy. In the early 1990s, as shown in Figure 2, the unsatisfactory performance 
of the organization triggered the response of organizational leaders. Attributing the ultimate 
cause of the declining performance to a loss of clarity and consensus around the identity of 
the organization, they turned their attention to the claims and beliefs that underpinned 
strategic projections.  
The losses of the previous years brought top managers to conclude that the image of 
luxury and exclusivity built in the previous decade had to be altered in order to appeal to a 
different target audience; an audience that, they believed, appreciated the “old” B&O but had 
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been alienated by the recent drift towards luxury. According to informants, this drift had 
brought advertising and retailing to overlook qualities that could have justified the high price, 
driving away potential buyers who thought of products as too expensive and “not for them”. 
This strategy might have been justified temporarily by a persistent period of economic 
growth and the diffusion of hedonistic values and the search for status symbol. Recent 
changes in the market, however, had made the target segment of this strategy much less 
attractive, and the projection of B&O as merely about “luxury” unable to connect with a 
sufficiently broad range of constituents for the company to survive. In order to spur new 
growth, they reasoned, it was necessary to define a set of claims that, in their view, could 
favourably realign all the images projected by the various parts of the organization with the 
expectations of external constituents.  
As shown in Figure 2, the perceived misalignments among identity beliefs and 
strategic projections brought managers to engage in identity management in order to realign 
beliefs around a new strategy that could effectively address external expectations. As an 
informant observed, “the identity of the company” was to become “a reference point in the 
changes that were taking place”, helping to “ensure coherence between our products, our 
image, which is also influenced by our communication, and the expectations of consumers.”  
In order to identify a new conceptualization of the organization that could be used to 
realign beliefs, investments, projections and expectations, in mid-1992 managers initiated an 
in-depth assessment of what organizational members and customers perceived as central and 
distinctive of the organization. The process was based on two groups working in parallel 
without knowing each other’s results. 
The first group carried out a field survey with four international groups of actual and 
potential customers. The customer groups were representatives of a segment of the market 
that managers considered their primary target in the future. The groups were selected from 
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two countries that had suffered less from the recent recession and, such was the reasoning of 
the managers, where B&O still enjoyed an appealing image for a sizable target constituent. 
Managers expected the field study to identify features that could be used as a “platform” for 
coordinating the projection of images across different units and countries. The survey found 
that “B&O was regarded as a company that creates harmony between aesthetics and 
technology” (Annual Report 1992-1993). People in the four groups ranked “the immediate 
perception of technological excellence” (reliability, high performance, advanced research, 
etc.) as the main features associated with the organization. All the groups indicated “the 
emotional side of the product” (as reflected in the design, in the choice of material 
components and in the mechanical movements) as number two. All the other potentially 
distinctive features were ranked lower.  
Mr. Knutsen assigned a second group the task of identifying and defining what he 
referred to as the “essence” of B&O – or, in other words, to clarify the essential features that, 
in their view, distinguished the organization and its products from their competitors. The 
group was composed of six members, including the CEO himself. The stated purpose was to 
“find, renew and strengthen” the identity of the company. Although the group did not deny 
the validity of previous conceptualizations of the organizational identity, they perceived the 
Seven CICs, in the words of one informant, as referring “too much to the products, and too 
little to the organization.” As the CEO told us, the task was to produce a statement about 
what Bang & Olufsen really was, which would not be restricted to the corporate 
communication office, but that “referred to the whole company”: a statement that “could be 
explained to people in the factories, and to the dealers.” 
Eventually, the group produced what was later referred to as “The New Vision”: “The 
best of both worlds: Bang & Olufsen, the unique combination of technological excellence and 
emotional appeal.” This statement summarized what members perceived as core and 
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distinctive about the organization, as clearly reflected in the words of a member of the group: 
What we came out with in the end was a statement of “what B&O is.” We 
chose it because it is true and because no one else can say the same 
(Communication Manager). 
Another member of the group observed that the fact that the two groups had come to 
very similar conclusions simplified the selection of those attributes that could help regain 
consistency between internal and external perceptions of the organization, and that should be 
emphasised, from then on, in product design and corporate communication.  
In summary, a perceived misalignment among strategic projections, and between 
them and external expectations, brought organizational leaders to engage in what we refer to 
as identity reassessment – understood as the explicit review of organizational features, with 
the aim of selecting a new set of claims that could favourably realign how internal and 
external constituents make sense of the organization and of its characteristics manifested in 
its strategic investments. Contrary to what is predicted by current theory, organizational 
leaders did not try to counter discrepant perceptions through impression management, but 
questioned themselves regarding what attributes of the organization could be plausibly 
claimed as core and distinctive and at the same time meet the expectations of critical 
constituents. 
Reformulation of Identity Claims 
The most immediate outcome of the process described above was the reformulation of 
the official statements about the identity of the organization, embodied in the “New Vision”. 
As the top management team declared: 
The B&O vision is a description of the company’s “raison d’être” and its role 
in relation to society. It is a role with which the group management and the 
employees should be able to identify themselves and the company’s customers 
should find compatible with the well-known Bang & Olufsen identity. (AR 
1992/93) 
Managers intended the new claims to become a guiding principle for future product design, 
  23 
advertising, communication, and any other activity impacting on the images projected by the 
organization.  
In the following months, in order to facilitate the implementation of the new claims in 
concrete guidelines for organizational policies and practices, managers articulated a set of 
capabilities that they believed to underpin “technological excellence” and “emotional 
appeal”. The capabilities they identified were labelled as “design”, “sound and picture 
reproduction”, “integration of audio and video”, “user interface”, “choice of materials and 
finish”, “micro-mechanical movements”, and “quality control.” As declared in the Annual 
Report 1992-93, managers perceived these capabilities as the pillars of their differentiation 
strategy and they planned strategic investments in order to enhance them as described in the 
following section. As shown in Figure 2, managers used the new claims to give sense and 
consistency to strategic decisions (identity consistent strategy) and identity management 
efforts (identity refocus and identity tuning) aimed at changing perceptions of the 
organization, as discussed in the remainder of this section. 
Identity Consistent Strategy 
The New Vision was not a commercial slogan. In fact, it was never explicitly 
employed as a tagline in advertising campaigns and the claims it embodied addressed 
primarily an internal audience. The new management expected the New Vision to ensure 
coordinated support across the organization to a differentiation strategy, the core elements of 
which were summarized in the new identity statement. As Mr. Knutsen told us, “We never 
used the Vision towards our customers. That was not the intention. They were words that you 
were supposed to use and discuss internally.”  
The New Vision was first used to give sense and direction to changing product 
strategies. The first tangible outcome of the new identity statement was the release of the 
BeoSound Century, a new audio system targeting a younger and less affluent segment to 
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stimulate sales growth, soon followed by another product addressing the same target: TV LE 
6000. Managers perceived the release of simpler and less expensive products as a risk, as it 
could have confused the image of the company, thus making other lines less attractive. As 
Mr. Knutsen publicly remarked: 
[B&O has to] extend its product range to include cheaper products, which are 
accessible for a wider clientele (…) We have to make a wider basis for 
growth. And the risk involved in it is obvious, if we are not careful. How do 
we ensure that the new cheaper products do not damage our image – and thus 
make our other products less attractive? For instance by making sure that the 
new products have the same characteristic B&O features. ‘The best of both 
worlds.’ The technical quality and the emotional values. (What? Nov. 1993). 
As an informant observed, it was clearly understood by management that any line 
extensions needed to take place “respecting the identity of the company.” Following the 
principles embodied in the New Vision, product developers had dropped some features (e.g. 
system integration) and retained others (e.g. infra-red sliding doors) so that the new product, 
although simplified in design and offered at a lower price, would be coherent with the desired 
B&O image. Record sales for BeoSound Century contributed substantially to restore the 
profitability of the organization.  
In the following months, managers also used the New Vision to explain other 
important investments. While some plants had been closed down, one was upgraded due to 
the strategic importance of the aluminium treating process that was carried out there. As an 
informant explained while showing us a new remote control: 
Try this remote control: your hand will never get sweaty. That’s because of the 
way we treat the aluminium surface. This is important for the “emotional 
appeal” of our product, and that’s why we did not discontinue the investment, 
while we closed down the production of cables and wires (Product Developer).   
Finally, in order to facilitate the design of product features that “surprised” and 
“delighted” the user, managers invested in a new facility where a team of psychologists and 
technicians could observe users interact with prototypes. The new “operation room” was 
expected to enhance the capacity to “emotionally appeal” to its customers through unusual, 
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but easy-to-approach user interaction (see Table 2). 
Theoretically, the release of new products and the investment in new operating 
capabilities can be considered as strategic investments aimed at “creating value for 
constituents by providing them with options that satisfy their interests (Rindova and 
Fombrun, 1999, 695).” These investments built on current capabilities and product features, 
accentuating characteristics that top managers viewed as important to recapture the consensus 
of customers. In this respect, then, as illustrated by the double arrow in Figure 2, strategic 
investments were partly inspired and partly substantiated the new claims. The purpose of the 
identity refocus program that accompanied these investments was to give sense to these 
investments and to re-align members identity beliefs in order to ensure consistent image 
projections. 
Identity Refocus 
The reassessment process brought top managers to affirm that the organization’s 
difficulties were not due to “deficiencies in the basic idea behind the product strategy”, and 
that the search for a more favourable image did not require radical changes. According to 
them, customers’ expectations could be met by emphasizing attributes that were already part 
of the organization, but that, over time, had been “set aside.” Accordingly, managers 
attempted to draw members’ attention to a common set of claims regarding the attributes that 
they considered meaningful and attractive to current and potential customers. 
Managers considered the alignment of members around a common understanding of 
the organization as crucial to the projection of a clear and coherent image: 
[The image of a company] is formed by all its actions. That is why it is so 
important – at least for the company – that it fully realizes how it wants to be 
regarded. (What?, Nov. 1993) 
Between the end of 1993 and mid 1994, articles in the house magazine and messages 
from the top management explicitly addressed issues of organizational identity, in order to 
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raise members’ awareness of the implications of how the organization was perceived 
internally and externally (see Table 2). Managers invited every employee from headquarters, 
and many from the international network, to Corporate Identity Workshops, where managers 
strove to clarify the concept and its importance for B&O’s competitive success. Identity 
seminars were associated with an exhibition, The Curious Eye, which traced the history of 
B&O’s identity over the last 70 years. The exhibition used past communication materials to 
illustrate how the identity of the organization had been periodically redefined – as manifested 
in changing corporate mottos and other identity statements – along with its evolving 
strategies. As an informant put it, managers presented the New Vision, as the “enduring 
essence” of B&O, “a confirmation of the past and a guide for the future.” Despite its name, 
managers did not present the New Vision as an aspirational statement aimed at inducing a 
radical change in the organization, but as a “reminder” of what the organization – in the 
managers’ views – “really was”.  
In summary, through the initiatives described above, managers attempted to realign 
members’ understandings around a new set of claims, in order to regain consistency among 
strategic projections, and between them and organizational policies and practices. In their 
view, realigning organizational identity and image did not require substantial change, but the 
recovery of past understandings of the organization (reflecting past investments), albeit 
embodied in formally different claims. Managers, therefore, used new identity claims to 
encourage members to revise their beliefs, finding new anchors in features that were 
perceived and presented as an existing part of the organization. 
Theoretically, we refer to this process as identity refocus – understood as the crafting 
of a self-referential narrative aimed at recovering past referents, by increasing their salience 
in members’ beliefs about the organization. Past accounts of identity change typically 
described managers advancing new claims about the organization to encourage the 
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engagement in what they perceived as more efficient or more effective practices (e.g. Nag et 
al., 2007; Kjergaard et al., 2011). Identity refocus differs from what was described by 
previous research in that it does not demand the embrace of a radically new set of claims 
about the organization. On the contrary, identity refocus is based on managers’ perception 
that the organization already possesses the features (values, practices, capabilities, etc.) 
required to secure the consensus of constituents, but that they are not effectively taking 
advantage of them. In other words, identity refocus is aimed at realigning the beliefs that 
underlie strategic projections with strategic investments that are currently overlooked. New 
claims, therefore, are crafted in order to turn members’ attention back to these features and to 
encourage them to incorporate these features in how they make and give sense of the 
organization. In this respect, identity refocus represents a deliberate attempt to counter a 
perceived identity drift, to the extent that the new understandings resulting from the drift are 
perceived as less desirable than the old ones. 
Identity Tuning 
As Figure 2 shows, new claims were not only used to support internal identity 
management. After working to ensure that all employees shared the same identity beliefs 
about B&O, top management’s attention turned to actors that were peripheral to the 
organization. As we have mentioned earlier, retailers contributed to the propagation of 
images of the organization and its products that were not entirely appealing to its constituents 
or consistent with the aspirations of top managers. According to Mr. Knutsen, however, 
B&O’s sales suffered due to “the imperfect transmission of the values and the principles 
embodied in the products.” After what we have described above as identity reassessment and 
identity refocus, therefore, managers engaged in a third set of initiatives aimed at ensuring 
that retailers accurately “transmitted” to consumers the images projected by the organization 
through its various forms of communication.  
  28 
Managers considered consistency between what they believed to be the distinctive 
attributes of the organization (and in which they had strategically invested) and how retailers 
portrayed it as critical to the firm’s relationship with this critical external constituent. As the 
CEO explained, “the dealers who have grasped the soul of the products achieve far better 
results than those who would simply like to have a few luxury offers in their mixed bag.”  
Our informants substantiated this interpretation by pointing to the rising sales at dealers that 
managers perceived as “loyally” implementing the company’s communication policies. 
It is not surprising, then, that ensuring that all retailers shared the same 
understandings of the organization was identified as a strategic issue. This belief was clearly 
expressed in the 1993-1994 Annual Report: 
We have realised that, in order to comprehend the philosophy of the company 
– and recognise its potential for growth – it is vital that we ourselves and our 
dealers share these ideas. 
Managers redefined the goal of marketing activities as “to make sure that the 
distribution chain all the way through to the customer gets the same message.” The Match 
Point program saw more than 600 dealers visiting headquarters and participating in a training 
course that illustrated new products and explained product design in terms of core values and 
competencies. As an informant observed: 
The new vision is not intended to be only a set of guidelines for research and 
development. (…) it should be transmitted to all the final retailers, asking 
them if they agree. If they don’t, they may as well sell something else 
(Communication Manager). 
In addition, the company held special seminars for regional trainers, whose job was to 
ensure that the dealers understood how to sell B&O products. Seminars focused on product 
positioning, defined as “the way we want B&O to be perceived by the consumer.” As Claus 
Bundegaard, the coordinator of these seminars, stated, “[i]t is not a question of having a 
personal attitude, but a uniform one which we all loyally should support”. 
In summary, managers intended these initiatives to ensure the consistency between 
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strategic projections and how the network of independent dealers portrayed the organization. 
Theoretically, retailers can be conceived as “peripheral” actors. By peripheral we refer to 
actors, such as agents, franchisees or exclusive retailers, who are formally not part of the 
organization, but may be perceived as such by external constituents because they are directly 
involved in the sales and delivery of an organization’s products, and they do so under the 
name of the organization. By mediating interactions with external constituents, these actors 
may heavily influence external perceptions. Yet they may neither identify with the 
organization, nor share members’ beliefs about core and distinctive features. While it is 
possible that these actors make bona fide efforts to positively influence external perceptions, 
their actions may eventually result in inconsistent projections, ultimately blurring the 
organizational image.  
Unlike the refocus process described earlier, which presupposes the realignment of 
internal beliefs through the recovery of past referents, by identity tuning we refer to 
managerial attempts to reduce inconsistency in strategic projects by making identity claims 
available to peripheral actors and encouraging the incorporation of these claims in their 
beliefs about the organization. By doing so, organizational leaders provide peripheral actors 
with guidance and discursive resources to give sense of the organization according to the 
desired image. While identity refocus is expected to influence a broad range of organizational 
practices, then, identity tuning is mainly intended to ensure consistency in the communication 
activities of peripheral actors.  
Identity-Consistent Communication 
Informants agreed that the concerted efforts to influence the beliefs of members and 
peripheral actors had produced the desired effect; that was a more coordinated projection of 
organizational images reflecting a new set of identity claims (see Figure 2). In order to 
achieve this effect, identity-related initiatives were associated with substantial changes in 
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communication structures and policies, reinforcing alignment among strategic projections. 
Managers centralized marketing and retail policies (from the design of store concepts to the 
production of training material for salespersons), and produced strict guidelines for 
communication and advertising. They also restricted the ability of country managers to adapt 
material and campaigns to local markets by moving some of these functions to a regional 
headquarter in Brussels. The number of dealers was also severely reduced, as B&O 
increasingly focused on exclusive stores, which followed strict central policies regarding 
store design, product display, assortment, etc., and were supported by centralized training for 
salespeople. According to informants, these efforts went a long way to realign the beliefs and 
understandings of marketers, advertisers and retailers. As an informant remarked:  
Our retail network is now thinner than it used to be, but – also thanks to the 
massive efforts we made with Match Point – those left have a clearer view of 
what Bang & Olufsen is. Or at least of what we think it is. (Sales Manager) 
Although our data did not allow us to directly ascertain whether new claims were 
eventually incorporated in the beliefs of all the members, or even of their majority, multiple 
observations point to the relative success of the identity management strategies described 
above and suggest that the new claims eventually “stuck”. First, all our informants seemed to 
accept the new claims as a truthful description of the organization. Second, no resistance or 
open disbelief was ever reported or observed (although it is quite likely that retailers that did 
not buy into the new values were dismissed). On the contrary, informants mentioned how, 
during presentations and identity seminars, the new claims were welcomed. Product 
development and advertising quickly incorporated new referents, as manifested in the new 
BeoSound line, and in the new catalogues replacing luxury symbols with what informants 
described as a warmer and more “humane” tone based on the association between individual 
products and unconventional users. Third, managers displayed commitment to the new 
claims, not only by substantiating them with changes in structures and practices, but also by 
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prominently using them in self-referential discourse for at least five years.  
More importantly, as changes were implemented, commercial and financial results 
improved. By the end of 1994, the company had become profitable again, and in 1996 its 
share price was almost ten times higher than three years before. Over the course of the 1990s, 
turnover grew steadily and the return on equity stabilized around 20%. Following Rindova 
and Fombrun (1999), we consider the eventual recovery of growth and profitability as 
indication that strategic projections were eventually realigned with a set of strategic 
investments – embodied in organizational structures, capabilities and product features – that 
effectively addressed the expectations of constituents. Of course, not all of these investments 
were made by the new managers. However, the revised claims likely managed to reorient the 
attention of members to capabilities and features resulting from past investments that had 
been overlooked in the previous decade, but according to the new management could be used 
to rebuild a viable differentiation strategy. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Our study investigated how managers at B&O addressed a perceived misalignment 
among identity beliefs, strategic investments, and strategic projections, and between these 
projections and the perceived expectations of external constituents. Our study provides 
insights that enrich our understanding of how misaligned projections arise and are attended 
to, and of the interrelations between identity management and strategic change (see Table 3 
for a summary). 
Our observations suggest how temporal identity discrepancies (identity drift) and 
projected image discrepancies (image blurring) may induce organizational leaders to engage 
in identity management – rather than impression management – in order to realign strategic 
projections with their identity beliefs (as reflected in new strategic investments) and desired 
image. By highlighting the various identity management strategies that managers can engage 
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in to address identity discrepancy, our observations point to the “identity maintenance”5 that 
underlies the preservation of congruence among strategic projections and between these 
projections and strategic investments and perceived constituents’ expectations. 
Our observations also complement the current emphasis on the social validation of 
identity claims (Ashforth and Mael, 1996; Pratt and Kraatz, 2009) by suggesting that the 
sustainability of these claims may also require an “anchor” in the material reality of the 
organization resulting from past and emerging strategic investments. Based on our 
observations, we propose an interpretation of identity adaptation as introspective “discovery” 
based on a) the periodic selection of emergent features or latent features that could be 
plausibly claimed as distinctive and that may satisfactorily address constituents’ expectations, 
and b) on the enhancement of these features by identity-consistent strategic investments and 
projections. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
In the following sub-sections, we discuss implications for theory and future research 
arising from our observations. Before we do that, it is important to acknowledge a potential 
limitation of our study. Our study was largely based on a corpus of texts reflecting managers’ 
interpretations of identity issues and the narrative that they produced in order to realign 
members’ beliefs, strategic investments and strategic projections. As common in grounded 
theory building, then, our model largely reflects the interpretations of our informants. Other 
beliefs, such as for instance those of previous top managers or other organizational members, 
were inferred from the observations of our interviewees and other documental evidence, and 
from their practical manifestations in past investments in product development, advertising, 
                                                 
5
 Brown and Starkey (2000) use the term ‘maintenance’ to refer to a number of psychological defences that 
members turn to in order to counter threats to their self-esteem; we use the term in a different conception, to 
refer to social practices that are activated to constantly uphold and preserve a common understanding of the 
organization. 
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etc. Identity beliefs, then, represent an (partly) unobserved variable in our study, which we 
mostly inferred indirectly from other sources. In order to compensate for this shortcoming, 
we paid particular attention to triangulate our informants’ observations with archival data. 
The implications of this limitation for our argument will be properly acknowledged as we 
discuss our observations. 
Identity Drift as a Source of Identity Discrepancy 
Past research on identity discrepancy has generally focused on construed image 
discrepancies (“We are not what they think and say we are”) (e.g. Dutton and Dukerich, 
1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Martins, 2005), and future-oriented temporal identity 
discrepancies (“We are not yet what we want to be”) (e.g. Corley, 2004; Corley and Gioia, 
2004). Our study enriches this line of inquiry by highlighting members’ responses to past-
oriented temporal identity discrepancies (“We are not what we used to be”) and to projected 
image discrepancy (“The way we portray ourselves is not what it should be”).  
At B&O, managers partly explained these discrepancies as a consequence of what, 
building on Albert and Whetten (1985), we have termed “identity drift” – understood as a 
gradual identity change, characterized by increasing misalignment between past claims and 
beliefs embodied in official identity statements and changing managers’ beliefs manifested in 
new strategic investments.  
While our study traced managerial responses to a perceived identity drift, our data 
allowed us to capture only indirect evidence of the drift itself. From the perspective of top 
managers of B&O during the nineties, what we have retrospectively labelled as an identity 
drift was probably a more or less conscious attempt to alter the strategy, based on a new and 
emerging understanding of the organization and a new desired image. For a few years, the 
new strategy seemed to effectively address the expectations of constituents. The new course 
of action, however, was never properly explained through a new set of identity claims. The 
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Seven CICs remained as official identity statements even when new strategic projections 
seemed to have little to do with the principles they embodied. In the absence of clearly 
articulated new claims to give sense to the new strategy, what could have produced identity 
change eventually resulted in identity drift. 
Future research may extend our understanding of identity drift by investigating in 
more depth the conditions under which they unfold. Consistent with past research, our 
informants’ accounts pointed to two possible antecedents of identity drift. First, identity drift 
could be caused by the recruitment of a new CEO from outside, who may bring new beliefs 
and aspirations, manifested in changing organizational strategies and a new desired image 
(Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Kjergaard et al., 2011). If the new leader does not produce a new 
self-referential narrative helping internal and external constituents make sense of the new 
course, the identity of the organization may drift as policies and practices become 
increasingly misaligned with the official statements.  
Second, consistent with previous research (Hatch and Schultz, 2002), our informants’ 
accounts pointed to the “hyper-adaptation” of managers to the expectations of external 
constituents, resulting in new understandings of the organization that largely mirror external 
images. Research has shown that exposure to favourable external images may induce 
members to redefine their identity beliefs mirroring representations that satisfy their need for 
self-enhancement (see Kjergaard et al., 2011). Under these circumstances, members may be 
brought to gradually disregard features that are not directly acknowledged by externally 
produced images. Hyper-adaptive identity drift may lead to temporary benefits related to the 
fit between strategic projections and external expectations. Scholars, however, consider a 
discrepancy between strategic projections and the organizational material reality untenable in 
the long run (Fombrun, 1996). An interesting avenue for future research, then, lies in a closer 
investigation of whether and how the projection of images that are not backed up by 
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organizational practices, widely-held values, etc., can be sustained over an extended period of 
time, and with what implications for internal identity work? 
Future research may enrich this emerging picture by investigating other possible 
sources of identity drift. Our observations point to specific causes of drift that induce some 
member’s to gradually alter their perception of the material reality of the organization. It 
remains unclear, however, whether organizational identities may also be subjected to 
“natural” drifts, as a consequence of long-term changes in organizational demography, 
patterns of activity, etc.  
Future research may also investigate what brings different members to respond 
differently to identity drift and to be more or less sensitive to temporal identity discrepancies. 
At B&O, according to our informants, the drift towards luxury seemed to be more readily 
embraced by top managers and marketers. This observation is consistent with past research. 
Hatch and Schultz (2002), for example, maintain that members at the interface with external 
constituents may be more sensitive to external representations and prone to hyper-adaptation. 
Corley (2004) also shows how employees in lower levels of the organization tend to have 
more inertial, inward-looking conceptualizations of their organization than top managers. 
Future research may investigate more systematically how variables such as hierarchical level, 
tenure, and position may affect differential response to identity drifts.  
Identity Maintenance and Strategy Formation 
Our observations complement and extend Rindova and Fombrun’s (1999) theory of 
competitive advantage by highlighting identity management process that underlies strategy 
making. Past research has shown how identity beliefs affect how organizations respond to 
environmental challenges (e.g. Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998). 
Our findings extend this line of inquiry by suggesting how the articulation of these beliefs 
into a new set of claims underpins strategy formulation and implementation. Identity claims 
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and beliefs drive viable responses to environmental challenges insofar as their referents are 
embodied in investments (made or in the making) that satisfactorily address the needs and 
expectations of constituents. In this respect, the reassessment process described earlier, along 
with the reformulation of identity claims, brings both the “strategic plot” that is expected to 
provide coherence and continuity to the investments and the projections that underpin the 
strategy of an organization above the threshold of awareness (Rindova and Fombrun, 1999). 
The reformulated claims are then used to develop a new narrative tying strategic investments 
to distinctive attributes and capabilities, that can be accepted by organizational members and 
appealing to external constituents. 
It might be argued that our focus on the perspective of top managers allowed us to 
capture only part of the identity dynamics unfolding at B&O between the late 1970s and the 
mid 1990s. Indeed, in organizations multiple narratives may co-exist, implying or advancing 
different understandings and conceptualizations (Brown, 2006). By no means do we claim to 
have analyzed the organizational identity: the possibility of “multiple identities” (Pratt and 
Foreman, 2000) is intrinsic to our notion of identity claims and beliefs. We recognize that our 
approach might have led us to downplay alternative identity narratives advanced elsewhere in 
the organization (e.g. in the factories or sales branches) and by other categories of employees 
(e.g. factory workers). In fact, during our study, we encountered instances of other identity 
narratives or metaphorical claims. None of these narratives, however, was as prominent in 
self-referential discourse and as grounded in concrete organizational commitments6 as those 
we have described. Most importantly, none of these narratives directly addressed the 
investments and projections required to secure the support of constituents. In other words, 
none of these narratives was “strategic”. 
 In this respect, it is not surprising that identity management at B&O involved mainly 
                                                 
6
 According to Whetten (2006), these are fundamental conditions to label self-referential discourse as bona fide 
identity claims. 
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members involved in activities such as product development, communication, and retailing. 
This focus reflected the primary concern of top managers to realign strategic investments and 
projections in order to improve organizational performance. Recent studies show how 
different concerns may lead top managers to focus their identity management efforts on 
supporting changes in other elements of the organization, such as human resources systems 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2008), organizational structures (e.g. Kjergaard, et al., 2011) or 
goals (e.g. Nag et al., 2007). Future research may build on the increasing range of case 
studies of identity management in strategic change to build a higher-order framework linking, 
for instance, different types of change, with different scope, focus, and primary audiences of 
identity management. 
It could also be argued that, rather than identity management, what we observed was 
really an instance of “corporate brand” management (e.g. Hatch and Schultz, 2004). Yet, as 
Kärreman and Rylander (2008) show, corporate branding is an identity management practice, 
in that it entails the purposeful attempt to express a core set of values and meanings, 
addressing external as well as internal audiences. Kärreman and Rylander (2008) argue that 
corporate branding contributes to enhance the attractiveness of belonging the firm, therefore 
strengthening members’ identification. Our observations suggest an even more substantial 
contribution of corporate branding practices in creating opportunities for the expression and 
elaboration of identity claims and beliefs. Future research may investigate more in more 
depth the internal implications of “externally-oriented” attempts to realign identity and 
strategy. In other words, as employees display a natural tendency to stick to “past identities” 
(Corley, 2004), “branding” initiatives aimed at adapting to external conditions and/or 
constituents’ expectations, may result in cascading misalignment among members who are 
less exposed to the environment. Consequences may range from resistance to the 
unacknowledged divergence of beliefs, as it seems to have been the case during B&O’s drift 
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towards luxury. Future studies may investigate further the conditions under which cascading 
misalignments arise, and identity management efforts succeed or fail. 
Our study has begun to unpack the identity maintenance process as a set of identity 
management strategies. At B&O managers adopted these strategies in sequence in order to 
repair what they perceived as a drifting identity and a blurred image. More research, 
however, is needed to investigate the conditions that shape the relative effectiveness of each 
strategy. At B&O the growth and profitability they regained let us reasonably assume that the 
new claims successfully reconciled strategic investments and constituents’ expectations. 
However, whether the observed result is a natural consequence of the three strategies, or 
depends on the specific way in which they were implemented at B&O, remains unclear. For 
instance, while the process we have described aims at reconciling internal beliefs and external 
expectations, the actual result – i.e. the referents of the reformulated claims – is likely to be 
shaped by the perspectives that are brought to bear on it, and in particular by the hierarchical 
level (Corley, 2004) and professional background (Glynn, 2000) of those involved. In fact, 
identity reassessment may not necessarily be followed by identity refocus, if the process 
brings members to conclude that substantial change is required. In this respect, future 
research may investigate whether and how the tenure of organizational leaders influences the 
outcome of the process, and in particular, the tendency to ground new claims in past vs. 
current investments, or to recover past claims vs. mirroring current images.  
Social Validation vs. Material Anchoring: Identity Adaptation as Discovery 
More generally, we believe that our findings contribute to improve our understanding 
of how members engage in the construction and reconstruction of organizational identities. A 
social constructionist conception of organizational identity as what members believe and 
define it to be implies an understanding of organizational identities as socially negotiated, 
possibly transient, conceptualizations of an organization (Brown, 2006; Gioia et al., 2000). 
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Past research in an interpretive perspective has argued for the importance of social validation 
– understood as “legitimizing feedback” from external perceptions and representations (Pratt 
& Kraatz, 2009; Gioia et al., 2010) – but has paid less attention to the issue of whether and 
how these conceptualizations are actually substantiated by organizational material reality. 
Past research on the interrelations between organizational identity and image has implicitly 
assumed a relative degree of malleability of the former, by emphasising the “primacy” of 
external images in triggering changes in organizational identity aimed at bringing it to 
conform to external expectations (e.g. Price and Gioia, 2008; Tripsas, 2009). 
Our study suggests instead how both social validation and material anchoring – 
understood as the consistency between identity claims and organizational structures, 
capabilities, product features, etc. resulting from strategic investments – shape the outcome of 
attempts to establish or revise identity claims and beliefs. At B&O, during the eighties, 
hyper-adaptive drift might have brought top managers to lose connection with organizational 
structures and capabilities, resulting from past investments: in the beginning of his tenure, 
Mr. Andersen did invest in upgrading technologies for sound and video reproduction; 
eventually, however, these investments and the resulting product features did not feature 
prominently in the images projected by advertisers and retailers. In other words, strategic 
projections gave only a partial account of the past investments of the organization 
Conversely, during the nineties, Mr. Knutsen made a synergistic use of strategic projections 
and investments, to clearly establish a connection between a revised conceptualization of the 
organization and the new strategic course. While the reformulated identity claims gave sense 
to the new strategic investments, the latter gave substance to the new self-referential narrative 
of the organization. 
By suggesting that, when it comes to identity change, both words and substance 
matter, our study encourages reconciliation between a social constructionist (e.g. Gioia and 
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Corley, 2004) and an essentialist perspective (e.g. Whetten, 2006) on organizational identity 
construction7. According to the former, organizational identities are socially constructed 
through discursive practices and acts that imbue claims with meanings and enact them in 
organizational structures and practices. Conversely, an essentialist perspective points at how 
perceived properties of identity features influence organizational practices and are eventually 
reflected in credible identity claims (Whetten, 2006). While the former perspective gives pre-
eminence to the constitutive role of language, emphasizing flexible adaptation resulting from 
the periodic renegotiation of shared beliefs (Gioia et al., 2000), the latter suggests how 
credible identity claims necessarily reflect more substantial properties of organizational 
referents, implying constraints to the actual capacity of organizational leaders to alter or 
renew self-referential discourse (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Whetten, 2006).  
The process of refocusing we have described suggests how a social constructionist 
and an essentialist perspective on organizational identity could be combined in order to 
produce a more realistic account of how organizational identities are periodically 
reconstructed. One of the fundamental functions of organizational identities is to provide 
members with a sense of self and continuity (Whetten, 2006). Over time, however, 
organizations may confront pressures to adapt their identity to changing environmental 
conditions (Gioia et al., 2000). The notion of “adaptive instability” has been advanced to 
account for how members manage to adapt while preserving a sense of continuity by 
periodically renegotiating the meaning of official claims (Gioia et al. 2000).  Based on our 
observations, we propose an alternative theory of identity adaptation that suggests how the 
organizational material reality, as a reflection of past strategic investments, may provide a 
reservoir of potential referents that leaders can selectively draw upon as they attempt to 
reshape shared identity beliefs in order to cope with changing internal and external 
                                                 
7
 We are indebted to David Whetten for this insight.  
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conditions.  
Organizational leaders, we argue, may promote “change within continuity” by 
periodically selecting (or re-selecting) a subset of all the features that could plausibly be 
claimed as central and distinctive, that are perceived as fitting current circumstances, and re-
enacting them by making them salient to members through reformulated identity claims. 
Adaptation, then, is not attempted by directly promoting substantial changes, but changes are 
encouraged by selectively re-focusing the attention of members on established or emerging 
referents. The notion of adaptive instability implies that continuity is achieved by preserving 
formal claims and retrospectively “revising history” to account for current interpretations 
(Gioia et al., 2000). Our observations point to the complementary process through which 
members attempt to preserve a sense of continuity by using reformulated claims to 
acknowledge emergent, latent, or “forgotten” capabilities, product features, etc. Adaptation in 
turn is achieved by acknowledging emerging changes or leveraging on past investments that 
may have regained relevance for the constituents that the new strategic course addresses.  
Identity Adaptation as Discovery 
Our observations imply a conceptualization of the adaptation of organizational 
identities to changing environmental challenges as a process of “discovery”, rather than a 
process of “invention.” Identity scholars generally acknowledge the importance that identity 
claims are supported by credible commitments embodied in organizational structures, 
policies, etc. (Whetten, 2006). Radical new identities, then, are likely to require enormous 
strategic investments to retain congruence between the identity and the materiality of the 
organization, and may imply a loss of past investments, that may be justified only in the 
presence of dramatic environmental changes (technological discontinuities, etc.). With rare 
exceptions (e.g. Kjergaard et al., 2011), research on attempted identity change mostly reports 
resistance and failure (Humphreys and Brown, 2002; Nag et al., 2007) or remains silent about 
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the outcome (Gioia and Thomas, 1996). Empirical evidence, therefore, seems to corroborate 
the notion of identity as enduring, rather than adaptable (e.g. Whetten, 2006), and points to 
the difficulty of introducing new conceptualizations of the organization that imply substantial 
changes in social practices (Nag et al., 2007) and social structures (Humphreys and Brown, 
2002). Based on these findings, one might be brought to conclude that deliberate identity 
change is nearly impossible.  
Our findings suggest instead that identity management may encounter less resistance, 
to the extent that new claims reflect established or emerging “investments” – that is 
organizational commitments to policies, structures and practices – that may only be partly 
acknowledged by current claims and beliefs. Identity adaptation, then, can be conceived as an 
introspective process aimed at identifying features and capabilities that can be plausibly 
claimed as core and distinctive, while at the same time satisfactorily address the concerns and 
expectations of critical constituents. New identity claims, then, can be used to acknowledge 
and consolidate emerging features, rather than push the development of entirely new ones. 
Indeed, these observations assume that organizational leaders are able to detect 
organizational referents that, while not part of current identity claims and beliefs, can be 
drawn upon to address external constituents’ expectations. In the case we have described, this 
process was partly carried out by attempting to reverse a perceived drift and rebuild past 
alignments. Part of the process, however, implied an attempt to increase the salience of some 
features (such as, in this case, the technological excellence of the organization and the 
emotional appeal of the products) that were perceived as relevant to the current target 
constituent, while downplaying other features included in previous claims that were 
perceived as less relevant to the current circumstances.  
It could be argued that this way of interpreting identity adaptation may be less 
relevant in circumstances where organizational leaders want to carry out a complete 
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transformation, and cannot find any feature inside the organization that can possibly be used 
to construct an appealing new identity. In fact, the issue raises the question of whether a 
radical identity change is feasible at all. Recent research suggests that positive media 
coverage may encourage members to embrace a radically new conceptualization of the 
organization, along with its substantial implications (Kjergaard et al. 2011). We still know 
little, however, about how organizational leaders can bring about substantial and enduring 
changes in organizational identity.  
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Table 1. Data sources and their use in the analysis 





B&O Magazine (7 issues, Nov. 1991- Mar. 1993), and 
What? (15 issues, Oct. 1993 - Dec. 1995) for a total of 476 
pages  
Capture managers’ interpretations of identity related issues, and the official identity-
related narrative available to organizational members. 
Collect detailed information on corporate events, decisions, and actions, and triangulate 
observations and substantiate managerial interpretations of identity-related issues.  
Interviews 16 interviews to 10 informants: CEO (1 interview)*, 
country man. (2)*, communication man., headquarter (3)*, 
brand man. (2), sales man. (1), advertising man. (1), local 
communication man. (3), user interaction designer (1), 
product developer (1), 1 technician (1). 
* Members of the team in charge of reformulating claims 
Capture managers’ interpretations of identity related issues. 
Collect additional information about identity-related initiatives, and more generally on 
corporate events, decisions, and actions, and triangulate observations and substantiate 





Two corporate biographies (Poulsen, 1996; Bang and 
Palshøy, 2000), and other publications: Bang & Olufsen 
(1985, 12 p.); Bang & Olufsen: The way ahead (1988; 18 
p.); Bang & Olufsen 1925-1990 (1991, 20 p.), Bang & 
Olufsen (1998, 18 p.) 
Familiarize with the historical, organizational, and strategic context within which 
identity-related processes took place. 
Capture retrospective reflections of external observers and past members on identity-
related issues and programs between 1972 and 1993, and samples of identity narratives 
prior to 1993 
Annual 
reports 
Annual reports from 1989-90 to 1996-97 
 
 
Keep track of financial and commercial performance over the years, and collect detailed 
information of corporate events, decisions, and actions. 





The Seven CICs of Bang & Olufsen (1974, 8 p.) 
Transcripts of Corporate Identity Workshops (Dec. 1993 – 
Jan. 1994, 19 p.).  
Strategic Issues and Perspectives (an outline of intended 
cultural changes, 1994, 8 p.) 
There is ONE Bang & Olufsen (visual identity manual, 
1997, 14 p.) 
Retailer’s Guide (25 slides) and Trainer’s Guide (support 
manual, 1997, 18 p.) 
Capture managers’ interpretations of identity related issues, and the official identity-
related narrative available to organizational members.  
Collect additional information about identity-related initiatives, and triangulate 





Articles from the international business press (Furnham, 
1991; Myerson, 1993; Lindberg, 1994; Rohwedder, 1994; 
Echikson, 1997) 
INSEAD teaching case study (Kets de Vries, 1997) 
Familiarize with the context, and triangulate managers’ interpretations and observations 
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Selected evidence  






The top management was not in line with the company culture. It was dazzled by products and awards (Poulsen, 
1998, p. 39). 
The communication concentrated on luxury symbols instead of explaining the qualities that could have justified 







While concentrating on outer prestige, the products’ qualities – and the idea which lay at the heart of Bang and 
Olufsen existence – were ignored (Bang and Palshoey, 2000, p. 102). 
What used to be the strong points of communication were now the weak points, meaning the connection between 






For many years we have experienced that the markets have interpreted the messages from Business Development 
at their own pleasures (Sales Trainer, What? Feb. 1994). 
For many years B&O sent two different messages, in two different languages, spoken by two management groups 






If we begin speaking different voices – even if they have been adapted to quite well-defined target groups – we 
risk losing our credibility, the result of which is a blurred image (Identity Manager, CI workshop, Dec. 1993) 
[During the 1980s] the subsidiaries and the dealers got more influence – and identity was no longer under strict 
control. ... The result was a somewhat blurred image.  (What? May 1994) 




identity beliefs  
We were assigned a philosophical task: To codify the essence of Bang & Olufsen (Country manager, interview). 
The start of the process was asking ourselves: What is the raison d’être of Bang & Olufsen? We had to find it out. 
We had to trust in some features, some core values… The task was to make a vision that did not cover only the 
product, but the whole company (CEO, interview).  
 Assessment of 
externally held 
The purpose of the project was to verify whether the essence of the company, as perceived by clients, 
corresponded what was perceived internally (Communication manager, interview). 
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images A brand essence test was made this spring, including both people who had bought Bang & Olufsen products, and 
people who had chosen another brand. The test tells us the view that the target group has of Bang & Olufsen (AR 
1992/93). 
Identity refocus Claimed 
soundness of 
traditional claims  
Trying to change our fundamental identity would be a bad idea since it has proved to be extremely strong and 
efficient (Identity Manager, CI workshop, Dec. 1993). 
The vision should not replace the perception the company has of itself and which is already articulated in ‘The 
Seven CICs’ (CEO, in Poulsen, 1998, p. 96) 
 Need to dispose of 
multiple strategic 
projections 
It is just as important that all our communication activities clearly indicate that they are from the same sender. That 
they express the same identity. Because a company can have only one identity (CEO, What? Nov. 1993). 
We should communicate and express only one, uniform B&O identity (Identity Manager, CI workshop Dec. 1993) 
 Need to regain 
clear identity 
beliefs  
[An organization’s] identity is formed by all its actions. That is why it is so important that it fully realizes how it 
wants to be regarded (CEO, What?, Nov. 1993). 
Understanding Bang & Olufsen identity is a precondition for being able to further develop it (Editorial, What? 
May 1994). 
Identity tuning Members and 
peripheral actors 
should share the 
same beliefs  
In order to comprehend the philosophy of the company – and recognize its potential for growth – it is vital that we 
ourselves and our dealers share these ideas (AR 1993/94). 
The job of a producer is to create consistency between its products, organization and marketing. If the dealer does 
not understand this common identity, and act accordingly, he has to be replaced (VP Marketing and Sales, in 
Poulsen, 1998, p. 100) 
 Members and 
peripheral actors 
should project the 
same image  
The whole chain must be fit for fight and convey the same idea (VP Sales and Business Development, What? Jul. 
1994). 
Bang and Olufsen has the same identity all over the world. The same thing should apply to the training of retailers. 
(Regional Trainer, What? Feb. 1994) 
Identity-related outcome 
Reformulation 




We will ask you always to keep the following Vision of Bang & Olufsen in mind, because it tells us what it is that 
makes us different (Bang & Olufsen, 1998). 
Our purpose is to create harmony between emotional appeal and technological. This particular balance is what 
attracts our clients (CEO, Press conference, 1994)  
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 Articulation of 
distinctive 
capabilities 
The core competencies are selected due to their contribution to the excellence of user experiences and the 
uniqueness of Bang & Olusfen products, which is how B&O achieves market differentiation (CEO, Press 
conference)  











The product strategy itself has not changed, as it was only a question of widening the product range back to the 
level it had up until 1986-87 … with the same basic aesthetic and technical features characterizing all Bang & 
Olufsen products (Annual Report 1992-93, p. 15) 
Bang & Olusfen must mean the best at both ends of the price range… no matter which end of the price range you 
buy, the B&O special standards of quality are part and parcel of the purchase (CEO, press conference) 
 Investment in 
distinctive 
capabilities 
User interaction is one of the core competencies at B&O… B&O has decided to establish a usability lab as part of 
the user interaction design team … This is because B&O products must have the distinctive B&O identity (Press 
release, 1995) 
The Break Point plan assigned many processes to subcontractors. Only the strategically important – e.g. advanced 









There is no doubt that the period where the kingdoms each had their own marketing and perception of the company 
must come to an end. [Ebbe Pelle Jacobsen, VP Sales] wants to position Bang & Olusfen identically in all markets 
(Poulsen, 1997, p. 74) 
With Break-Point the company has changed the way of running the subsidiaries… To be an image-company you 
have to means the same thing to all people all over Europe. We must be one company, not send different messages 
as we did (Country manager, in Poulsen, 1997, p. 103, italics in original) 
 Focus on fewer, 
but loyal retailers 
The old objective, to extend the number of dealers, is changed into finding the right dealers. In France, for 
instance, they have to buy back the stocks of goods to be able to withdraw from a chain selling mostly discount 
products (Poulsen, 1997, p. 101, italics in the original).  
In the Break Point it is made clear that the marketing cannot be left to the individual subsidiaries. Bang & Olufsen 
is a brand-name that represents the company as a whole (Poulsen, 1997, p. 100).  
 Uniform visual 
identity 
Every time customers and other people see the name of a company, they must see the same thing… For a long 
period the way we have been writing our name has been a mix-up… advertisements, magazines, shops, windows, 
etc. shall in the future send uniform signals everywhere (CEO, visual identity manual, 1997).   
 
  52 
Table 3.  New insights on managing identity discrepancies  
 




Construed image discrepancy (Corley, 2004): Perceived 
external perceptions and representations differ from members’ 
perceptions and aspirations (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; 
Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Martins, 2005) 
Perceived identity drift: loss of traditional referents in identity 
beliefs (and the related strategic projections)  





Impression management (Elsbach, 2006; Gioia et al., 2000) to 
preserve favourable external perceptions and representations 
of the organization 
Identity management:  
Identity maintenance – identity reassessment, identity refocus, 
and identity tuning – to preserve alignment between strategic 
investments, strategic projections, and perceived constituents’ 
expectations  
Sustainability of 
identity claims  
Social validation: 
Identity claims are sustainable to the extent that they are 
‘validated’ by external perceptions and representations 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1996).  
Material anchoring: 
Identity claims are sustainable to the extent that they reconcile 
external perceptions and expectations with the material reality 





Projection of desired images is expected to pull identity 
beliefs, first, and organizational practices, next, into alignment 
with desired identity (Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Tripsas, 
2009). Adaptation of organizational identity is expected to be 
shaped by social negotiation, and to be fluid and relatively 
unconstrained (Gioia et al., 2000) 
Inside-out: 
Reformulation of claims suggests a reorientation of identity 
beliefs on a partly different subset of organizational structures 
and practices. No substantial change, but relatively 
constrained selection of features that can be plausibly claimed 
as enduring; organizational structures and practices resulting 
from past strategic investments as ‘anchors’ of the process. 
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Assessment of identity beliefs  
Assessment of externally held images 
Identity tuning Members and peripheral actors should share the same identity beliefs  
Members and peripheral actors should project the same image  
Managers’ beliefs mirror external representations  
Misalignment among internal beliefs 
Identity refocus 
Claimed soundness of traditional claims 
Need to dispose of multiple strategic projections 




Extension of product line preserving distinctive features 
Investment in distinctive capabilities 
Reformulation of 
identity claims 
Articulation of differentiating features 




Stronger coordination of international subisdiaries 
Focus on fewer, but loyal retailers 











Misaligned projections negatively affect image 
Strategic projections overlook traditional referents 
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Perceived identity discrepancies and 









Professor Ann Langley 





February 10, 2011 
 
 
Dear Prof. Langley,  
 
Please find enclosed our revised manuscript originally entitled ͞Strategies of Alignment: 
Managing Identity and Image at Bang and Olufsen͟ (SO-10-175) submitted for 
consideration for publications in Strategic Organization.  We are very grateful for your 
decision to conditionally accept our paper subject to the conditions outlined in your 
letter. We are also very grateful to you and the three anonymous reviewers for your 
additional suggestions and observations that we have found very helpful in our revision.  
 
Based on your guidance and suggestions, we have revised the paper as follows: 
 
a) Following your suggestions and the indications of Reviewer 2, we have largely 
rewritten the abstract, introduction, and theoretical framework in order to 
reposition the paper more convincingly as a study of the realignment of identity 
and strategy. We have also revised the findings section accordingly. 
 
b) We have eliminated the inconsistencies between the structure of our findings, 
tables and figures. All subsections of our findings now correspond to the second-
order codes shown in our data structure (Figure 1). 
 
c) We have extended our discussion, addressing the remaining concerns expressed 
by Reviewer 1.  
 
d) Finally, we have responded to the minor points raised by Reviewer 2. 
 
Our revision is now complete. We hope that the current version of the manuscript 
satisfactorily addresses your remaining reservations about the framing of our paper and 
the structure of our findings. Based on the revised framing of the paper, we have 
renamed the paper ͞Strategies of Alignment: Organizational Identity Management and 
Strategic Change at Bang & Olufsen͟ to highlight the fraŵiŶg aŶd ĐoŶtriďutioŶ ŵore 
clearly. 
  
The rest of this document is dedicated to a detailed reply to each point raised by your 
and the reǀieǁers’ ĐoŵŵeŶts. FolloǁiŶg your instructions, we have reported your 
concerns before presenting our replies and we have presented them in the same order 
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as in the original reviews. 
 
We would like to thank you once again for a constructive and developmental editorial 
process, and for all the insightful suggestions that helped us improve our paper greatly. 




Davide Ravasi and Nelson Phillips
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SO-10-175 Reply to the Editor 
 
1. Your concern: Adjust the framing of the paper as suggested by Reviewer 2  
Please ƌead ĐaƌefullǇ Reǀieǁeƌ Ϯ’s ĐoŵŵeŶts, ďut paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ his/heƌ poiŶt 4. I thiŶk this 
raises a really good opportunity to make the paper stronger and more original as a 
contribution to Strategic Organization. While identity and image concerns have been a 
long-time preoccupation for identity researchers, the identity-strategy connection seems 
to me to have been rather less developed. That is not to say that the categories that you 
currently have are not interesting, and I would not suggest changing them - rather I think 
you need to better integrate the idea of strategy - identity issues that come out in your 
empirical discussion into the framing of the paper. Note that Reviewer 2 also says (point 
4ĐͿ, ͞This foĐus ǁould also fit ďetteƌ ǁith Ǉouƌ data, ǁhiĐh to a ǀeƌǇ laƌge eǆteŶt ƌefleĐts 
the perspective of the top management team, so emphasizing the interplay between 
identity and strategy will be quite appropriate.͟   Please ĐoŶsideƌ ĐaƌefullǇ hoǁ Ǉou 
might respond to this constructively. 
 
A related point that occurred to me in reading your paper is that at the moment you 
insist on how previous researchers have essentially focused on impression management 
strategies foƌ ƌealigŶiŶg iŵage aŶd ideŶtitǇ. I ĐouldŶ’t help thiŶkiŶg that the ĐlassiĐ ǁoƌk 
of Dutton and Dukerich (Keeping an eye on the mirror) and Gioia and Thomas (1996) on 
identity-image alignment focused much more on how perceived images generated 
substantiǀe ĐhaŶges that ǁeƌe Ŷot just ĐosŵetiĐ. I doŶ’t thiŶk Ǉou haǀe doŶe justiĐe to 
these pƌeǀious ǁƌiteƌs aŶd I’d ask Ǉou to ƌethiŶk Ǉouƌ foƌŵulatioŶ. 
 
Finally, I found certain of your expressions in the upfront framing difficult to follow. For 
example, the folloǁiŶg phƌase is Ƌuite haƌd to get oŶe’s ŵiŶd aƌouŶd: ͞ĐoŶgƌueŶĐe 
among projected images, and between projected images, organizational material 
ƌealitǇ, aŶd the eǆpeĐtatioŶs of ĐƌitiĐal ĐoŶstitueŶts.͟ Theƌe is a lot iŶ theƌe - perhaps this 
needs to be systematically broken down. Also, I do not understand the meaning of the 
teƌŵ ͞eǆpeĐtatioŶs of ĐƌitiĐal ĐoŶstitueŶts͟ ǁhiĐh Đoŵes ďaĐk a lot ďut is Ŷot iŶ Ǉouƌ 





We are glad that you and the reviewers appreciated our effort to emphasize the 
strategic implications of our observations. Prompted by your suggestions, we have 
further elaborated along this line, and reframed our paper in order to embed more 
clearly our research question and our contribution in the literature on identity and 
strategy.  
 
We have largely re-written the abstract and introduction, following the logical structure 
suggested by Reviewer 2 as he/she writes (point 4): 
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͞As I ƌead Ǉouƌ papeƌ, I ǁas stƌuĐk ďǇ the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of the iŶsight that ǁhile stƌategiĐ 
projections and strategic investments MUST be updated to respond to changing market 
conditions, identity poses an inertial constraint. If this constraint is ignored or left 
unattended (as during the Andersen years) an identity discrepancy ensues; when tackled 
strategically (as during the period of your observations), important identity management 
sub-processes (described in your model) take place and enable the dynamic updating of 
both strategic projections and strategic investments, without identity discrepancy and 
poteŶtiallǇ iŵage ŵisaligŶŵeŶt.͟ 
 
Our study is now grounded more firmly and more explicitly in the theory of competitive 
advantage proposed by Rindova and Fombrun (1999), and in the literature on the 
interplay between identity and strategy. Following the advice of Reviewer 2 (points 4 
and 7), we have moved some text up from our discussion section that points more 
directly at the strategic management of identity and at the role of organizational 
leaders. 
 
In the literature review, we have greatly reduced the parts related to organizational 
image, and identity-image inconsistencies, and we have introduced entirely new parts 
that position our study within the literature on the identity-strategy connection, and 
highlight potential causes of misalignment between identity and strategy during 
strategic change. Overall, the structure of the theory section now maps closely the 
logical sequence highlighted above. 
 
Following comments from your and from Reviewer 2, we did not modify our categories 
and our discussion substantially, although we revised our terminology (for instance, we 
use ŵore ĐoŶsisteŶtly the terŵ ͞strategiĐ projeĐtioŶ͟ rather thaŶ ͞projeĐted iŵages͟), 
and some of our arguments according to the new framing. 
 
Following your suggestion, we have also revised our portrayal of Dutton and Dukerich 
(1991) and Gioia and Thomas (1996), emphasizing their observations about how identity 
beliefs and aspirations drive strategic decisions. 
 
 
2. Your concern: Repair alignment between your data structure (Figure 1), Model 
(Figure 2) and the text itself  
 
In the current version of the paper, I found the sequencing and connections between all 
the concepts to be confusing and inconsistent between the two models and the text First, 
please present your key concepts in a consistent order and consistent hierarchical 
relationship with each other (e.g., second order concepts within overarching 
dimensions). For example, Ǉou haǀe ͞ideŶtitǇ dƌift͟ aŶd ͞iŵage ďluƌƌiŶg͟ iŶ oŶe oƌdeƌ iŶ 
the diagrams and in a different order in the text. Moreover, these concepts do not have 
major titles associated with them as all your other second order concepts do. 
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Similarly, there is a very puzzling sequencing and hierarchical organization of the other 
diŵeŶsioŶs iŶ the teǆt. Foƌ eǆaŵple, iŶ Figuƌe ϭ, ͞ƌefoƌŵulatioŶ of ideŶtitǇ Đlaiŵs͟ is 
tƌeated oŶ the saŵe leǀel as ͞ideŶtitǇ ĐoŶsisteŶt stƌategǇ͟ aŶd ͞ideŶtitǇ ĐoŶsisteŶt 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͟ as aŶ ͞outĐoŵe.͟ ͞IdeŶtitǇ ƌeassessŵeŶt,͟ ͞ideŶtitǇ ƌefoĐus͟ aŶd 
͞ideŶtitǇ ƌetuŶiŶg͟ aƌe tƌeated togetheƌ as ͞ideŶtitǇ ŵaŶageŵeŶt stƌategies.͟ Hoǁeǀeƌ 
iŶ the teǆt itself, the oƌdeƌiŶg is Ŷot ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith this. You ŵoǀe fƌoŵ ͞ideŶtitǇ 
ƌeassessŵeŶt͟ ;a ŵaŶageŵeŶt stƌategǇͿ to ͞ƌefoƌŵulatioŶ of ideŶtitǇ Đlaiŵs͟;aŶ 
outĐoŵeͿ  to ͞ideŶtitǇ ĐoŶsisteŶt stƌategǇ͟;aŶ outĐoŵeͿ  to ͞ideŶtitǇ ƌefoĐus͟ ;a 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt stƌategǇͿ to ͞ideŶtitǇ tuŶiŶg͟;a ŵaŶageŵeŶt stƌategǇͿ to ͞ideŶtitǇ 
ĐoŶsisteŶt ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͟ ;aŶ outĐoŵeͿ. This is impossible to keep straight for the 
ƌeadeƌ. WheŶ ƌefeƌ iŶ the teǆt to ͞ideŶtitǇ tuŶiŶg͟ as ͞a thiƌd set of ideŶtitǇ iŶitiatiǀes,͟ I 
was completely lost as to what the other two were that you were referring to. Are they 
the tǁo ǁe’ǀe just ƌead aďout (identity refocus and identity consistent strategy which by 
the way are presented in Figure 2 as deriving from identity reassessment) or the two that 
they seem to be in Figure 1 (identity reassessment and identity refocusing). There is now 
a real problem of logic in your model that needs to be properly sorted out. Of course, all 
this ŵaǇ ĐhaŶge slightlǇ if Ǉou folloǁ Reǀieǁeƌ Ϯ’s ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs. But iŶ aŶǇ Đase, 
we need your argument to be totally consistent and clear. 
 




We apologize for the remaining inconsistencies between text and figures. In order to 
address this problem: 
 
1. We have reorganized the findings section around second-order codes. In order 
to follow the logical (and chronological) sequence of the model, second-order 
codes are not further grouped according to overarching themes. We believe that 
this solution allows readers to better follow the narrative of the process, because 
managers did not engage in the three strategies in parallel, but in rough 
sequence, with the outcome of the first phase (the revision of identity claims) 
becoming the input of later ones.  
 
2. In order to clarify the hierarchical relationships among second-order codes, in 
the beginning of the findings section, we have introduced a brief summary that 
outlines the three groups of constructs that constitute the core of our 
framework. 
 
3. OŶ p. ϭϯ, ǁe haǀe Đlarified the differeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͞ideŶtity ŵaŶageŵeŶt 
strategies͟ aŶd ͞ideŶtity-related iŶitiatiǀes͟, the latter terŵ referriŶg to the 
concrete activities through which each strategy is carried out in practice - e.g. 
identity reassessment (a strategy) was carried out through a survey of customers 
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in four countries and a task force refleĐtiŶg oŶ the ͞ďraŶd esseŶĐe͟ ;iŶitiatiǀesͿ  
 
4. Answering Reviewer 2 (point 6a), we have clarified how a gap between 
organizational performance and the aspirations of organizational leaders 
triggered identity reassessment – thereďy ͞ŵoderatiŶg͟ the liŶk ďetǁeeŶ iŵage 
blurring and identity reassessment (i.e. in absence of performance decline, it is 
less likely that image blurring is perceived as problematic and addressed through 
identity reassessment). This contextual condition is now explicitly included in our 
framework.  
 
5. Answering Reviewer 2 (point 6b) we have made explicit the two-way relationship 
between identity-consistent strategic investments and the revision of identity 
claims, both in the text and in the model. 
 
6. Following a suggestion of Reviewer 2 (point 6c), we have incorporated explicitly 
the terms strategic projections and strategic investments in our first-order and 
second-order codes, whenever appropriate. 
 
We thank you and the reviewer once again for pointing to this inconsistencies and 
pushing us to further refine our theoretical model. 
 
3. Your concern: Better reflect Reǀieǁer 1’s concerns in the discussion  
Reǀieǁeƌ ϭ has ͞ŵiǆed feeliŶgs͟ ďelieǀiŶg that Ǉou haǀe aŶ iŶteƌestiŶg Đase, ďut giǀeŶ 
that his/her view of identity is somewhat different from yours, s/he is still rather 
uncomfortable with your approach. S/he suggests in fact that what you are essentially 
dealing with is closer to an internal and external branding initiative that might have little 
to do with how internal organizational members other than top management and 
communications/marketing actually see the firm about which you really have little 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ. I agƌee ǁith this ĐoŵŵeŶt, ďut I thiŶk Ǉouƌ foĐus oŶ ͞ideŶtitǇ 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt,͟ as desĐƌiďed iŶ Ǉouƌ title is Ŷoǁ faiƌlǇ Đleaƌ aďout that. The ŵoƌe 
important issue is whether despite this limitation, your paper still makes a worthwhile 
and novel contribution. 
 
I would like you to introduce some reflections into the discussion that take into account 
Reǀieǁeƌ ϭ’s latest ĐoŵŵeŶts. Foƌ eǆaŵple, I thiŶk Ǉou ŵight ǁaƌŶ hoǁ atteŵpts to 
realign identity and strategy at the frontiers of the firm could lead to cascading 
misalignment between management and employees, and that there might be a need for 
further research on these issues. As well as the Corley (HR, 2004) paper which reveals 
poteŶtial disĐƌepaŶĐǇ ďetǁeeŶ leǀels, theƌe aƌe ŵoƌe ĐƌitiĐal peƌspeĐtiǀes oŶ ͞ideŶtitǇ 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt͟ ;e.g., AlǀessoŶ aŶd KaƌƌeŵaŶ, ϮϬϬ7, OƌgaŶizatioŶ “ĐieŶĐeͿ that Ǉou ŵight 
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The revised discussion of our paper now includes two pages of text that, as you 
suggested, address directly the concerns of Reviewer 2. 
 
Building on Karreman and Rylander (2008), we argue that, while it could be argued that 
much of what we observed could be labelled as corporate branding, corporate branding 
is iŶhereŶtly aŶ ideŶtity ŵaŶageŵeŶt praĐtiĐe. Furtherŵore, it is a ͞strategiĐ͟ oŶe iŶ 
that it addresses directly the core attributes of the organization (presumably resulting 
from past and current investments) to be enhanced in corporate communication (i.e. 
strategic investments). We have clarified that while we are aware that identity 
management may manifest itself in other forms (see Alvesson and Karreman, 2008), 
what we observed was particularly consistent with the research question driving our 
study. 
 
Following your suggestion, we tie this discussion with the potential implications of 
cascading misalignments resulting from strategies and/or branding initiatives that 
depart from current identity to address changing external conditions, and discussed it as 
an issue for further research.  
 
Finally, we have incorporated more explicitly in our theory section, observations from 
studies of organizational identity coming from a critical perspective (e.g. Alvesson and 
Willmott, 2002), to complement our discussion of how organizational identities act as 
sources of stability within organizations. 
 
 
4.  Your concern: Respond to other comments from Reviewer 2 
Lastly, please consider the other comments by Reviewer 2 concerning improving your 
labels (if possible) (point 5) and minor points. 
 
Reǀieǁer Ϯ’s ĐoŵŵeŶts aďout the laďelliŶg of our Đore ĐoŶstruĐts pushed us to 
reconsider, once again, the appropriateness of our choices. As suggested by Reviewer 2, 
ǁe refleĐted oŶĐe ŵore oŶ the uŶderlyiŶg proĐesses aŶd ͞ďraiŶstorŵed͟ oŶĐe ŵore 
about alternative labels. 
 
We must confess, however, that these labels were already the result of considerable 
reflection, and, we honestly find them the most appropriate labels (among the several 
we considered) for the three strategies we have described (from the point of view of the 
managers engaged in them): 
 
1. By ͞ideŶtity reassessŵeŶt͟ ;or ͞ideŶtity assessŵeŶt͟Ϳ, ǁe eŵphasize hoǁ 
managers openly interrogate themselves (and other constituents) about 
distinctive features of the organization, with the purpose of producing a new set 
of identity referents (eventually to be embodied in new claims) (other options 
we considered included identity audit, identity review).  
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2. By ͞refoĐus͟ ǁe poiŶt to hoǁ ŵaŶagers atteŵpt to ďriŶg ďlurred iŵages, uŶĐlear 
ideŶtities, fragŵeŶted ďeliefs ďaĐk to Đlarity, ďriŶgiŶg ŵeŵďer’s atteŶtioŶ ďaĐk 
;͞re-foĐus͟Ϳ oŶ a Đlear set of ideŶtity refereŶts ;other optioŶs ǁe ĐoŶsidered 
included identity recovery, perceptual alignment (core members)).  
 
3. By ͞tuŶiŶg͟ ǁe poiŶted to the attempt to adjust (not radically alter) projections, 
in order to ensure – to use a metaphor – the consistent transmission of a clear 
signal, that is the projection of a clear and consistent image, by promoting the 
assimilation of identity beliefs among peripheral actors (other options we 
considered included image tuning, identity extension, peripheral identification, 
perceptual alignment).   
 
In absence of specific suggestions, therefore, we will stick with the three terms, unless, 
of course, you consider one of the alternative options suggested above as more 
appropriate in which case we are happy to change.   
 
Finally, in order to address minor points raised by Reviewer 2, we have: 
 
- Removed text (about terminological fragmentation, refracted images, etc.) that 
was not strictly related to our arguments. 
 
- Provided full legal name of our site 
 
- Clarified or removed unclear or ambiguous sentences 
 
In conclusion, let us thank you and the reviewers once again for your substantial help in 
pointing out ambiguities and inconsistencies in previous versions of the paper, and for 
pushing us to refine our analysis and conceptual development. We believe that the 
current version of the manuscript is a substantial improvement to the earlier versions 
we submitted. We hope you will agree! 
 
 
